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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Japan is in the midst of reforming its national-level individual and corpo-
ration income tax systems. Last year, it abandoned its large system of
tax-free savings accounts and lowered individual marginal tax rates. A
much more radical proposal is currently being advocated by the govern-
ment and is well along the way toward passage in the Diet. The new
proposal would significantly lower the statutory rate for the corporation
income tax, lower individual rates further and increase the tax thresh-
olds, tax capital gains on securities for the first time, and introduce a
type of value-added tax. As a package, this would be the most important
change in the Japanese tax system since 1950.
This paper presents a brief summary of the Japanese income tax sys-
tem and the changes in it that have been enacted or proposed. It also
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discusses and evaluates the pressures for reform, both domestic and
international. Finally, the paper looks at how the taxation of capital
income in Japan has changed since 1980 and how it compares to the U.S.
taxation of capital income after our 1986 tax reform. One major finding of
the paper is that the effective marginal tax rate on corporate capital
income in Japan has increased sharply since 1980, from roughly 5 per-
cent to about 32 percent. This change, which stifi leaves the marginal
taxation on corporate investments somewhat lower in Japan than in the
U.S., is due to both changes in the Japanese tax code and the virtual
elimination of inflation in Japan.
1. INTRODUCTION
Japan is in the midst of reforming its national-level individual and corpo-
ration income tax systems. Last year, it abandoned its large system of
tax-free savings accounts and lowered individual marginal tax rates. A
much more radical proposal is currently being advocated by the govern-
ment and is well along the way toward passage in the Diet. The new
proposal would significantly lower the statutory rate for the corpOration
income tax, lower individual rates further and increase the tax thresh-
olds, tax capital gains on securities for the first time and introduce a type
of value-added tax. As a package, this would be the most important
change in the Japanese tax system since 1950.
This paper presents a brief summary of the Japanese income tax sys-
tem and the changes in it that have been enacted or proposed. It also
discusses and evaluates the pressures for reform, both domestic and
international. The U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986, with its low marginal tax
rates, is among the forces for change in Japan. Finally, the paper looks at
how the taxation of capital income in Japan has changed since 1980 and
how it compares to the U.S. taxation of capital income after our 1986 tax
reform.
Developments in the Japanese economy are worth monitoring if only
because Japan's is the second-largest economy in the world and its eco-
nomic performance is widely admired. It has achieved high economic
growth rates, a recently stable price level, a trade surplus, and a high
level of national saving and investment. In previous work (Shoven and
Tachibanaki, 1988), I found that in 1980 Japan had a much lower tax
wedge between the return on investments and the return enjoyed by
investors than had the U.S. That is, in Japan the government took a
smaller fraction and the investor a larger fraction of the return on a new
marginal investment. Two questions that this paper addresses are
whether that lower level of effective taxation on incremental capital in-Japanese Tax Reform and Corporate Investments99
come persists in Japan in 1988 and whether it will continue if the pro-
posed tax reforms are enacted.
2. THE JAPANESE TAX SYSTEM
Japan and the U.S. have the lowest overall tax burdens as a percent of
gross domestic product (GDP) of the countries listed in Table 1. Japan's
figure (28.0 percent) is slightly lower than that for the U.S. Japan also
generates far less revenue as a fraction of GDP from the household-level
income tax than does the U.S. In fact, Japan's revenue from the individual
income tax is less than that of any of the other countries except France. Its
reliance on sales and consumption taxes is the lowest among the eleven
countries. In contrast, its corporation income tax raises the highest frac-
tion of GDP (well over twice the comparable U.S. figure). It is this heavy
use of the corporation tax that made my previous result of light taxation of
income from new Japanese capital investments surprising.
As in the U.S., there are three levels of taxation in Japan: the national
level, the prefecture (state) level, and the municipal level. Ifwe exclude
the social security payroll contributions, the individual income tax raised
40.5 percent of the revenue at the national level, whereas the corpora-
tion tax raised 30.6 percent. Of the remaining 28.9 percent, liquor taxes
accounted for 4.8 percent, gasoline taxes 3.8 percent, and the inheritance
and gift tax 2.7 percent. The final 15.6 percent of revenue was raised
mainly by a wide variety of excise taxes. Corporate and individual in-
come is subject to taxation at both the prefecture and the municipal
levels (primarily according to the "inhabitants tax"). These local govern-
ments also raise revenue through property taxes, automobile taxes, an
enterprise tax, and a wide array of excise taxes.
The first thing to note about the national-level individual income tax is
that the individual is the taxable entity, rather than the householdas in
the U.S. For the average single-earner household, this difference is not
very important. In fact, the tax of most wage earners is automatically
calculated through a sophisticated withholding mechanism. Most indi-
viduals whose incomes are predominantly wages do not even have to fill
out a tax return. However, the individual basis of taxation does open up
the possibility of income splitting for self-employed small-business-
people and those with significant sources of capital income.
The marginal tax rate structures for the national-level individual in-
come tax are shown in Table 2 for 1986, for 1987 (after the September
1987 tax revisions), and for the 1988 proposal of the Ministry of Finance.
In 1986, there were fifteen rate brackets, with marginal rates ranging











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0Japanese Tax Reform and Corporate Investments101
ets, ranging from 10.5 percent to 60 percent; the proposal now under
consideration would replace these with five brackets, with marginal tax
rates from 10 to 50 percent. The number of rate brackets for the inhabit-
ants tax (local income tax) is proposed to be reduced from 14 (with rates
ranging from 4.5 percent to 18 percent) to four (with rates ranging from 5
to 15 percent). The top combined rate was 88 percent in 1986 and would
be 65 percent under the current proposal.
The puzzle of why the marginal rates for the individual income tax are
relatively high and revenues relatively low is partially answered by the
generous levels of the tax thresholds (the level of income below which
no tax is paid). Table 3 shows that the threshold level of wage and salary
income for a one-earner family of four will have increased by almost 36
percent in two years if the latest proposals are adopted. The proposed
tax threshold for a family of four is3,198,000, or $26,000, at the current
(1988/89) exchange rate (123 to the dollar), more than twice the tax
threshold in the U.S. for a family of the same composition (the sum of
the U.S. system's standard deduction and personal exemptions for a
family of four was $8300 in 1986 and $12,800 in 1988). Note that the
average annual wage income in Japan is roughly4 million. It appears
that the Japanese have used their relatively low reliance on individual
income tax sources to increase the progressivity of their tax system
rather than to enjoy the efficiency that could have come from lower
marginal rates. This feature of relatively high income thresholds is long-
standing and was one of the primary reasons that Pechman and Kaizuka
(1976) found that only 33 percent of Japanese national income was re-
ported as taxable income in 1970, compared with 59 percent for the U.S.
at that time. Despite the high top rates, note that Tables 2 and 3 together
imply that under the new proposal a one-worker family of four would
remain in the 10 percent national income tax bracket until their earnings
reached7,162,650, or $58,233. This income level (at which the Japanese
rate will jump from 10 to 20 percent) is at least 20 percent higher than the
income level for a family of four at which the U.S. rate jumps from 15 to
28 percent. About 90 percent of all workers in Japan will face the lowest
marginal rate, and many will remain in the lowest tax bracket for their
entire planning horizon. This last feature effectively eliminates the prob-
lem of timing income to minimize taxes.
In principle, the Japanese individual income tax system applies to
aggregate income (such as interest income, dividend income, rents, busi-
ness income, wages, retirement income, timber income, and capital
gains). In practice, many of these income sources are eligible for special









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0Japanese Tax Reform and Corporate Investments103
TABLE 3
Income Tax Threshold for a Family of Four (employee, spouse, two
children, one between 16 and 22 years old)
Source: Ministry of Finance
a 40 percent of first1,650,000 in salary, plus 30 percent of amount between1,650,000 and3,300,000,
plus 20 percent of amount between3,300,000 and6,000,000, plus 10 percent of amount between
6,000,000 and10,000,000, plus 5 percent of the amount over10,000,000. The minimum employment
income deduction is570,000.
rately, and interest, dividends, and capital gains are often taxed sepa-
rately at the taxpayer's option.
The treatment of interest income has been among the most generous
of these special treatments. Until the September 1987 tax reforms, there
were two special features of the law favoring interest income. First,
Japanese taxpayers were allowed to have four types of saving plans
offering tax-free interest. The types of tax-free interest were
Interest accruing from postal savings, if the principal did not exceed
3million.
Interest income or distribution of profits from deposits, bonds, and
debentures, open-end bond investment trusts, or specific stock invest-
ment trusts, if the total amount of principal did not exceed k3 mil-
lion. This provision was called the Small Saving Tax Exemption
(Maruyu in common Japanese).
Interest on central-government and local-government bonds, not ex-
ceeding k3 million in total face value.
Interest income or distribution of profits received in accounts set up
for the formation of employees' assets, particularly for housing and
pensions. Various forms of monetary assets are eligible for this exemp-










Basic exemption 330 330 350
Exemption for spouse 330 330 350
Special exemption for spouse- 165 350
Exemption for children 330 330 350
330 330 450
Employment incomea deduction 872 951 1,124
Deduction of social insurance
premiums
165 183 224
Total 2357 2619 3198104John B. Shoven
tracts withholding part of their wages and that the total amount of
principal does not exceed5 million.
Summing up these four items, an individual could have had up to ½14
million ($113,821) in nontaxable forms. If the household had several
members, the amount of nontaxable saving could be increased accord-
ingly. A family of four could have legally held over $455,000 in tax-free
saving vehicles. Further, there was widespread evidence of abuse of this
system, with accounts being held in fictitious names. Nagano (1988)
estimates that over 70 percent of all personal saving took advantage of
these tax-exempt vehicles, with13.5 trillion ($110 billion) escaping the
tax base.
The tax-exempt saving system was abolished in the 1987 reform, except
for those deemed truly to need social assistance (the elderly, single-parent
families, and the handicapped). It has been replaced with a flat tax on all
interest income (withheld at source) of 20 percent, with 15 percent col-
lected for the national government and 5 percent as local taxes.
The second tax advantage offered on interest income is separate taxa-
tion. Even before 1987, interest received on saving deposits and similar
accounts (other than tax-exempt ones) was subject to a separate 20 per-
cent withholding tax at source and then could be excluded from taxable
income in filing a return. For other forms of interest income (bond inter-
est, and so on) the taxpayer could aggregate it with taxable income or
pay a separate tax of 35 percent. None of interest income was subject to
the marginal rates, ranging up to 70 percent, shown in the rate schedule.
This separate taxation option will remain available if the present reform
package is adopted.
The taxpayer also has the option of separate taxation of dividend
income. Again, this effectively shields the dividend recipient from the
highest marginal tax rates in Table 2. For dividends, the marginal rate for
the optional separate taxation is 35 percent, as long as the recipient owns
less than 5 percent of the outstanding equity and as long as the amount
of dividends received from that corporation is less than500,000
(roughly $4000). Rich investors can avoid these limits through diversifica-
tion. However, separate taxation is unavailable on the dividends of
closely held corporations. For small dividends, there is an even better
treatment. If an individual receives a dividend of less than100,000
($800) from a company (excluding mutual funds), he or she may elect
separate taxation at the marginal rate of 20 percent.
In addition to the advantages of separate taxation, dividends are
lightly taxed at the individual level due to another feature of the individ-
ual tax law. For taxpayers with ordinary taxable income of less than10Japanese Tax Reform and Corporate Investments105
million ($81,300), a tax credit amounting to 10 percent of dividends
received is allowed. For those with higher taxable mcomes, the credit is
reduced, although it always exceeds 5 percent. The basic 10 percent
credit means that the maximum marginal rate of national-level taxation
of dividends (under separate taxation) is effectively 25 percent (10 per-
cent for small dividends).
Capital gains on securities are not taxed in Japan, although the current
proposal would change this. It would give taxpayers the option of pay-
ing a tax equal to 1 percent of the value of the stock transaction or paying
a separate tax on the actual gain, at the rate of 20 percent. The 1-percent-
of-sales-value option implies that capital gains on securities will still be
very lightly taxed in Japan relative to their current treatment in the U.S.
(fully taxable at ordinary rates upon realization). Capital gains on land
and buildings are taxed separately in Japan, with the terms depending
on the holding period.
Before the 1987 tax reform, corporate capital return was extremely
lightly taxed at the personal level in Japan. Most interest income com-
pletely escaped taxation, as did all capital gains on securities. Dividends
had the option of separate taxation and thus escaped the marginal rates,
which went as high as 70 percent. If the Ministry of Finance proposal is
adopted, this will change substantially. Almost all interest income will
be separately taxed, at a 20 percent rate. However, capital gains wifi still
be lightly taxed, and dividends wifi still be eligible for a tax credit and
optional separate taxation at a 35 percent rate.
The general outline of the corporate income tax in Japan is not terribly
different from that in the United States. As in our country, the tax base is
corporate profits, or the excess of gross revenue over total costs. In-
cluded in costs are the interest payments on debt obligations (both
bonds and bank loans). In other words, interest expenses are deductible,
as in the United States. The corporate tax is approximately a flat-rate
system (also as in the United States), with slightly lower rates applying
only to very small corporations.
The Japanese corporation income tax differs from the American one in
its treatment of dividends paid and intercorporate dividends. The cur-
rent Japanese tax system attempts to partially offset the double taxation
of corporate equity income by taxing dividends paid at a lower rate than
retained earnings. The current national rates are 42 percent for retained
earnings and 32 percent for dividends paid (reduced in 1987 from 43.3
and 33.3 percent, respectively). The effective rates, including local taxes,
are approximately 55 and 45 percent, respectively. The Ministry of Fi-
nance estimates the overall marginal corporate tax rate on equity income
as 51.55 percent in 1988 (down from 52.92 percent in 1986). This com-106John B. Shoven
pares with their estimate of the U.S. rate (including statecorporation
income taxes) of 40.34 percent.
The current reform proposal would phase out this separate treatment
of dividends and returned earnings. It proposes that the national corpo-
ration income tax rate be set at 37.5 percent for 1990 and beyond. While
this is only slightly higher than the U.S. corporate rate of 34 percent, the
difference widens when one takes state- and local-level taxation into
account. The Ministry of Finance estimates that the total Japanese corpo-
rate rate would be 49.99 percent under their proposals, compared with
the U.S. figure of 40.34 percent.
Unlike the U.S. tax system, the Japanese corporation income tax has
always exempted intercorporate dividend income from the tax base,
thus avoiding double taxation. However, the new proposal adopts the
U.S. practice of partial taxation of dividends received by a corporation. It
proposes including 10 percent of corporate dividends received in the
corporate tax base in 1989, with 20 percent (the U.S. figure) inclusion in
1990 and thereafter.
The Japanese tax system permits several types of tax-free reserves that
share to reduce reported corporate earnings and, therefore, taxes. These
reserves include (1) the reserve for bad debts, (2) the reserve for returned
goods, (3) the reserve for employee bonus payments, (4) the reserve for
retirement allowances, (5) the reserve for repairs and product guaran-
tees, and (6) the reserve for overseas market development for small and
medium-sized corporations. In 1986, the reserve fund for price fluctua-
tion was abolished.1
It is the interaction of the Japanese corporation and individual income
tax that can create very low effective taxation of corporate capital in-
come. Given that the corporate statutory rate is relatively high and the
individual rates on interest relatively low, interest payments are in effect
subsidized. The cost to a corporation of making a 10 percent interest
payment will be roughly 5 percent if the new proposed rate structure is
adopted. On the other hand, the investor will receive 8 percent (after the
20 percent tax). This net subsidy clearly reduces the cost of capital. It also
is less effective at lower nominal interest rates.
3. THE PRESSURES FOR REFORM
The preceding section described most of the elements of the enacted and
proposed tax reform. Those include virtual elimination of the tax-free
1As something of an aside, it might be noted that these reserve accounts lower corporate
earnings and may partially explain the traditionally high price-to-earnings ratios on Japa-
nese equity securities.Japanese Tax Reform and Corporate Investments107
saving system, except for people in special circumstances; reducing the
number of brackets and the highest rates for the individual income tax;
raising the threshold income levels of the individual income tax; lower-
ing the basic rate of the corporation income tax and eliminating the
different treatment of dividends paid and retained earnings; curtailing
the use of corporation reserve accounts; and introducing a tax on in-
tercorporate dividends.
There is one additional major component of the proposed tax reform.
That is the introduction of a new consumption-type value-added tax.
The current proposal is for a broad-based 3 percent tax with very limited
exemptions. There would be an exemption for very small enterprises
(sales less than $240,000) and a simplified procedure available to small
and medium-sized firms (sales under $4 million). A large number of
specific excise taxes (commodity tax, playing-cards tax, sugar excise tax,
admission tax, travel tax, electricity tax, and timber delivery tax, among
others) would be repealed. The commodity tax currently applies to a
number of luxury goods. However, in an economy as dynamic as Ja-
pan's, many of the taxed items (for example, air conditioners, television
sets, and refrigerators) are no longer appropriately considered luxuries.
There are a number of separate pressures for Japanese tax reform that
can be identified. These include compliance problems with the existing
tax system and a widespread feeling that it is unfair; international trade
frictions and pressures encouraging the Japanese to adopt a more pro-
consumption tax system; concern about the international mobility of
factors, particularly capital and entrepreneurs, in the face of a Japanese
system with comparatively high marginal tax rates; projections that gov-
ernment revenue will need to expand significantly to deal with the rapid
growth of the retired population; and concern that corporate tax revenue
would be jeopardized (through transfer pricing and financial arbitrage)
unless the Japanese corporation income tax is roughly harmonized with
the recently changed U.S. tax system.
3.1 Compliance Problems and Fairness Considerations
Fairness issues are probably the biggest motivator of the Japanese re-
form movement. The same may well have been true in the U.S. One
very important aspect of the Japanese compliance and fairness problem
is referred to as 10-5-3, or sometimes 9-6-4. These numbers refer to the
fact that it is commonly believed that 90-100 percent of the income of
workers is subject to tax but only 50-60 percent of business income
(particularly the income of small businesses) is reported and only 30-40
percent of farm income is subject to tax. This widely perceived inequality
has been documented in the research of Ishi (1984) and Honma (1984).108John B. Shoven
The problem is thought to have grown worse in the past twenty years
(Noguchi, 1988). The introduction of a value-added tax (VAT) is in-
tended to help this 10-5-3 problem in two ways: First, the required
record keeping and invoice reporting wifi improve income reporting for
the income tax. And, second, the VAT itself will be borne by all consum-
ers relatively evenly.
A second aspect of the compliance problem is that there is no taxpayer
identification scheme (similar to the U.S. social security number or tax-
payer identification number) in Japan. This facilitated the abuse of the
Maruyu saving system and adds to the general impression that the
wealthy can conceal income from taxation. There has been tremendous
political opposition to the introduction of an identification system. The
result has been increasing use of a withholding-at-source system (now
for interest income as well as wages, and proposed for capital gains). It is
hoped that the combination of withholding taxes and a VAT will consid-
erably improve the fairness of the Japanese tax system.
3.2 The Aging Society
The Japanese position in Table 1 as the least-taxed major country in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is
largely due to its relatively light social security burden. Japan has one of
the lowest fractions of the populations that is elderly, but it also is aging
more quickly than any other major economy. The upper panel of Table 4
shows that the number of people of working age per elderly person in
Japan is projected to fall from 5.9 in 1985 to 2.3 in 2020. This ratio is, of
course, of utmost importance for pay-as-you-go national retirement
schemes such as those in Japan and the U.S. Some of the expenses of
Japanese social security coverage are paid for out of general revenue,
and the expectation is that the reliance on general revenue will have to
be increased. The lower panel of Table 4 shows that while Japan had the
lowest fraction of elderly in their population between 1950 and 1985, by
2000 their elderly fraction will be more than 30 percent greater than in
the U.S. By 2020, they will have the highest fraction of elderly of the five
countries shown. It is projected that the fraction of the Japanese popula-
tion over sixty-five will be more than twice the fraction that are currently
elderly in either the U.S. or Japan. The 28 percent total tax load shown in
Table 1 is expected to rise to about 50 percent, unless the design of the
social security system is altered. The proposed new VAT, which would
be introduced with an initial 3 percent rate, is thought to have the
potential to become a major contributor to the revenue necessary for
dealing with the aging population. If this is to be so, of course, it will be
necessary to raise the tax rate markedly.Source: Watanabe (1988), p. 13.
3.3 Labor Supply and the Brain Drain Fear
Reducing the progressivity of the individual income tax isan important
and intentional element of the Japanese tax reform. Noguchi (1988)re-
ports that high-salaried workers whose incomes are roughly k10 million
($81,300) or more have been exerting strong political pressure for relief.
This pressure was increased by the flattening of the marginal tax rate
schedules in both the U.S. and the U.K.
There has been little opposition to lowering the top marginal rates.
Due to the possibilities for separate taxation, theyare only applicable to
the high salaries of top executives, entertainers, athletes, andso on.
There seems to be concern about the labor-supply effects of the high
tax rates. More pointedly, there is concern about the location decisions
of high-tech international firms. Hasegawa (1988) states that "the bur-
den it (the Japanese tax system) imposes on high-incomeearners is
undeniably an impediment to the flow of elite business personnel into
Japan." He feels that Japanese businesses now are trying to lure high-
caliber foreign talent to Japan but that they are finding both traditional
labor practices and the tax systems to be severe handicaps. Further, he
worries about a "brain drain" away from Japan, as executives find that
they can locate facilities abroad with lower labor costs andmore attrac-
tive tax environments.
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TABLE 4
The Aging of Japan
1985 2000 2010 2020
Ratio of elderly (65 and over) to total population
(in percent)
1950 1970 1985 2000 2020
Japan 4.9 7.1 10.3 16.3 23.6
West Germany 9.4 13.2 14.5 16.7 21.2
France 11.4 12.9 12.4 14.7 18.0
United Kingdom 10.7 12.9 15.1 15.3 17.8
United States 8.1 9.8 11.7 12.0 15.4
Ratio of working age population 5.9 3.7 2.8 2.3
(20-64) to elderly population
(65+)110John B. Shoven
3.4 Financial Arbitrage and Transfer Pricing
At least as worrisome as a loss of highly skilled labor (or aninability to
attract top talent to Japan) is a possible capital outflowdue to Japan's
relatively steep corporate tax rate. With the U.K.'s reduction of its statu-
tory corporate rate from 45 to 35 percent in 1986 and the U.S.'slowering
of its rate from 46 to 34 percent, many Japanese are worried about their
international competitive position with respect to this tax.
The problem of having a high statutory corporate rate is not only that
capital will locate elsewhere but also that reported domestic profits of
international companies may be transferred abroad. Multinational com-
panies have a strong incentive to borrow in countries with high tax rates
in order to lower equity profits there. Further, the use of internal trans-
fer pricing can shift reported profits from higher-rate countries to those
with lower rates. It is possible that high corporate rates thus become
counterproductive in terms of generating revenue. This type of argu-
ment, and the concerns of transfer pricing and international borrowing,
have been major pressures for lowering corporate rates in Canada as
well as in Japan.
If the current reform is adopted, Japan, the U.S., and the U.K. will
have very similar rates of corporate taxation at the national level. The
rates will range from 34 to 37.5 percent. Such a narrow rangeprobably
stops most accounting practices designed solely forrelocating profits.
4. THE EFFECTIVE RATE OF TAXATION ON
CORPORATE CAPITAL INCOME
My earlier work with Tachibanaki (Shoven and Tachibanaki, 1988)found
that the Japanese government got a very small percentage (4.4 percent)
of the return on domestically financed incremental investments in 1980,
while the investor (on average) got 95.6 percent of the return. In this
section, the methodology that gave us that finding is summarized and
the results are recalculated for 1985 and for the 1988 proposed reform
package. The new results differ dramatically from those of the earlier
study.
The Shoven and Tachibanaki study used the same methodology as
King and Fullerton (1984). What is examined is the total tax wedge
between the return of an incremental investment and the return realized
by the investor or financier. The approach takes into account both
company-level taxation and personal-level taxation.
In this paper I use exactly the same methodology. In fact, I use the
PTAXJAP software made available by Mervyn King. This softwareJapanese Tax Reform and Corporate Investments111
adapts the King-Fullerton approach to the Japanese tax system andwas
used in King (1987). The input tax parameters are those I developed with
Tachibanaki, appropriately updated to 1985 and to reflect the reform
proposal.
As in Shoven and Tachibanaki (1988) and King and Fullerton (1984),
the tax wedge and effective tax rate are calculated separately for different
types of assets, financial instruments, industries, and types of investors.
Three types of assets (machinery, buildings, and inventories), three fi-
nancial instruments (debt, retained earnings, and new equity issues),
three industries (manufacturing, commerce, and other, which is mostly
construction, transportation, communications, and utilities), and three
classes of investors (households, tax-exempt institutions, and insurance
companies) are distinguished. All told, then, there are three possibilities
in each of four categories, which means that there are 81 different combi-
nations. All investments are assumed to earn a real return of 10 percent.
The software calculates the net return earned by the investor for each of
the eighty-one combinations, as well as the total taxes collected for each.
Features of the tax law that are taken into account include accelerated
depreciation, inventory accounting, investment tax credits, the de-
ductibility of interest payments from the corporate income tax, the treat-
ment of capital gains, and the interaction of taxation and inflation in the
tax system.
Table 5 contains the effective tax rate (the tax wedge divided by the
gross real return) results for Japan for 1985. The figures are calculated for
three rates of inflation, 0 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent. The figures
in each row refer to the average marginal tax wedge for 27 different
combinations of investment flows. For example, the number for "machin-
ery" with 5 percent inflation is 18.9 percent. This is the average marginal
tax wedge for machinery investments in three different industries, using
three sources of finance, and for three different classes ofowners. Simi-
larly, the number for debt (-28.6 percent) is the average for three types
of debt-financed assets in three industries with three different classes of
owners. The pattern shown in Table 5 for 1985 is quite similar to the
results in Shoven and Tachibanaki (1988) for 1980. Both sets of results
show that the overall effective marginal tax rate was low at 10 percent
inflation but substantially higher at lower rates of inflation. The main
reason for this inflation effect is that the effective tax rate on debt-
financed investments declines rapidly as nominal interest rates rise. In
1985 Japan had a total (national plus local) corporate tax rate of 57per-
cent for retained earnings. Given that interest payments were deductible
from this tax and were very lightly taxed at the individual level,a net
subsidy resulted for debt-financed investments. The effective tax rate for112John B. Shoven
TABLE 5
Effective Marginal Tax Rates (percent) in Japan, 1985
equity-financed investments actually rises with inflation, primarily due
to unindexed depreciation deductions.
Despite the fact that the pattern of the numbers in Table 5 is similar to
those for 1980, the "best guess" effective marginal rate of taxation on
corporate investments in Japan changed considerably between1980 and
1985. Shoven and Tachibanaki (1988) estimated the overallfigure to be
4.4 percent in 1980. However, that result depended on aspecification of
the expected rate of inflation, which was taken as the averageof the
inflation rates experienced in the 1970s (9 percent). By 1985, Japan had
experienced several years of 2 percent inflation. If that is taken as the
expected rate of inflation, the overall tax rate for 1985 is about 26 percent.
The effective tax rate calculations for the current proposal areshown
in Table 6. The increased tax on interest income, the reduced corporate
tax rate, the elimination of the differential betweenretained earnings
and dividends, and the new capital gains tax on profits on securities are
all captured in the model. The tax reform would slightly increase the
effective corporate tax rate at zero inflation and would make the tax rate
much less sensitive to inflation. The large potential subsidy todebt-




Machinery 23.0 18.9 10.0
Buildings 27.2 18.4 3.9
Inventories 39.6 23.0 6.2
Industry
Manufacturing 30.2 23.8 13.8
Other industry 24.0 10.4 7.6
Commerce 35.0 23.3 9.7
Source of finance
Debt 2.9 -28.6 -64.8
New share issues 57.6 72.2 84.7
Retained earnings 51.9 60.8 67.1
Owner
Households 23.8 9.9 -7.6
Tax-Exempt investors 26.6 15.1 0.1
Insurance companies 57.8 70.0 78.8
Overall 29.6 20.1 7.0Japanese Tax Reform and Corporate Investments113
TABLE 6
Effective Marginal Tax Rates in Japan under the 1988 Tax Proposal
(percent)
tory corporate tax rates and by the increase in the taxation of interest
income at the individual level.
The "best guess" overall effective tax rate for new corporate invest-
ments in Japan after the implementation of the 1988 tax reform proposals
is 31.8 percent. The reason that this number is chosen from the bottom
row of Table 6 is that there is now a remarkable degree of price level
stability in Japan. Consumer prices rose 0.6 percent in 1986 and 0.1
percent in 1987, and they are expected to increase about 0.4 percent in
1988.
The overall conclusion that I draw from Tables 5 and 6 is that the
effective rate of taxation of new investment in Japan has risen substan-
tially since 1980. Most of that increase has taken place because of the
elimination of inflation. The tax reform itself would increase the effective
tax rate slightly (at 0 percent inflation) and take a major stride in making
the system less sensitive to inflation, should it return. The tax incentives
for debt, while still considerable, would be substantially reduced.
The effective tax rate faced by Japanese investors on domesticcorpo-
rate investments remains lower than the effective tax rate faced by




Machinery 26.5 27.8 25.7
Buildings 30.1 28.2 22.2
Inventories 39.7 32.3 24.5
Industry
Manufacturing 31.9 31.5 28.3
Other industry 28.0 23.2 15.4
Commerce 36.0 32.1 26.3
Source of finance
Debt 13.5 -2.1 -2.1
New share issues 57.3 75.0 91.2
Retained earnings 46.5 54.7 60.2
Owner
Households 27.3 21.9 13.9
Tax-exempt investors 23.6 15.8 5.3
Insurance companies 54.7 67.7 78.0
Overall 31.8 29.4 24.3114John B. Shoven
narrowed, however. Fullerton (1987) found that at 4-percentinflation,
the 1986 tax reform raised the overall U.S. effective tax rate on new
corporate investment from 29.4 percent to 41.1 percent.The U.S. tax
reform's main accomplishment in this area was evening the treatmentof
different corporate assets (for example, plant versus equipment)by elimi-
nating the investment tax credit on equipment and by adjustingdeprecia-
tion lifetimes. Tables 5 and 6 indicate that the differences across asset
type were not great in Japan even before theirreform. What neither
country has addressed is the substantial differencebetween the treat-
ment of owner-occupied housing and corporatecapital investments.
5. CONCLUSION
The Japanese tax reform proposals are extremely significant.The proba-
ble changes in the system are at least as fundamental asthose contained
in the U.S. 1986 Tax Reform Act. The taxation of theformerly tax-free
savings accounts, the introduction of a tax on securitycapital gains, and
the adoption of a VAT wifi greatly improve the perception offairness of
the system. The VAT is likely to be the tax vehicle that willpermit Japan
to finance its rapidly growing dependent elderlypopulation. And a com-
bination of several elements in the reform as well as thealmost complete
absence of inflation may cause the effective tax rate on corporatecapital
income to increase to a point where it is comparable,although still
lower, than the corresponding U.S. figure. The reforms of1987 have
already reduced the tax system's bias toward debt and made itseffects
on investment incentives lessdependent on the rate of inflation.
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